Better Late than Never; Scaling Computation in Blockchains by Delaying
  Execution by Das, Sourav et al.
Better Late than Never; Scaling Computation in
Blockchains by Delaying Execution
Sourav Das∗§, Nitin Awathare†, Ling Ren∗, Vinay Joseph Ribeiro† and Umesh Bellur†
∗University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
†Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
{souravd2, renling}@illinois.edu, {nitina, umesh}@cse.iitb.ac.in, vinayr@iitb.ac.in
Abstract—Proof-of-Work (PoW) based blockchains typically
allocate only a tiny fraction (e.g., less than 1% for Ethereum) of
the average interarrival time (I) between blocks for validating
transactions. A trivial increase in validation time (τ) introduces
the popularly known Verifier’s Dilemma, and as we demonstrate,
causes more forking and increases unfairness. Large τ also
reduces the tolerance for safety against a Byzantine adversary.
Solutions that offload validation to a set of non-chain nodes (a.k.a.
off-chain approaches) suffer from trust issues that are non-trivial
to resolve.
In this paper, we present TUXEDO, the first on-chain protocol
to theoretically scale τ/I ≈ 1 in PoW blockchains. The key
innovation in TUXEDO is to separate the consensus on the
ordering of transactions from their execution. We achieve this
by allowing miners to delay validation of transactions in a block
by up to ζ blocks, where ζ is a system parameter. We perform
security analysis of TUXEDO considering all possible adversarial
strategies in a synchronous network with end-to-end delay ∆ and
demonstrate that TUXEDO achieves security equivalent to known
results for longest chain PoW Nakamoto consensus. Additionally,
we also suggest a principled approach for practical choices of
parameter ζ as per the application requirement. Our prototype
implementation of TUXEDO atop Ethereum demonstrates that it
can scale τ without suffering the harmful effects of naïve scaling
in existing blockchains.
I. INTRODUCTION
One major problem of PoW blockchains such as Bitcoin
and Ethereum is that they have useful compute power of
orders of magnitude less than a typical desktop. For ex-
ample, the gas limit of each Ethereum block corresponds
to a block processing time (τ ) of approximately 150 mil-
liseconds.1 Thus only 1% of the block interarrival time (I)
of 15 seconds in Ethereum is used for executing transac-
tions. This prevents permissionless blockchains from accept-
ing blocks that contain computationally-heavy transactions.
Such computationally-heavy transactions are desirable for ap-
plications such as cryptographic trusted setup and privacy-
preserving computation.
To see why one cannot arbitrarily increase τ , we must
understand the actions taken by a miner on receiving a new
block and then describe the effect of naively increasing τ . The
miner first validates the block by executing all its transactions,
then proceeds to form its own block whose transactions it
executes, and finally starts Proof-of-Work (PoW) to mine a
§Part of the work was done when the author was at IIT Bombay
1Measured using a virtual machine with 16 cores, 120GB memory, 6.4TB
NVMe SSD, and 8.2 Gbps network bandwidth.
new block. The protocol requires a miner to validate a block
before mining on it for the following reasons. First, it ensures
that the creator of the block executes the transactions correctly
according to the protocol specifications. Second, it ensures that
all miners maintain an updated state; which is desirable for
users with low computation resources (a.k.a., light clients).
Problems due to large τ . In existing PoW chains, higher
validation time τ “eats into” PoW time. This gives significant
advantages to miners with higher block processing power than
others, and also opens up the system to various attacks. As
we demonstrate in §VII and Appendix B, with a larger τ , an
adversary A who skips validation of received blocks and/or its
own created blocks can mine more than its fair share of blocks
relative to its mining power on the main chain. For example,
our experiments show that when τ/I = 0.2, an adversary A
controlling 33% of the mining power can mine as much as
68% of blocks on the main chain. A large τ also leads to the
well-known Verifier’s Dilemma [13] where a rational miner
has to make the hard choice between validating blocks or not.
The first choice reduces its chances of mining the next block,
and the second increasing its mining chances but comes with
the risk of accepting invalid blocks. Moreover, increasing τ
leads to a higher backlog of blocks to be processed at miners,
which delays block forwarding. This leads to more forks and
wasted mining power and lowers the adversarial tolerance of
the system [16], [17]. For these reasons, PoW blockchains
currently keep block validation time small relative to the block
interarrival time, i.e. τ/I 1.
Previous Work. Existing works that enable blocks with heavy
computation do so through off-chain solutions [11], [9], [4],
[20], [7], [6]. Rather than having all miners execute transac-
tions, which we term on-chain computation, these methods del-
egate computation to a subset of miners or groups of volunteer
nodes. These solutions make additional security assumptions,
beyond those required for PoW consensus, so that miners can
validate the results that voluntary nodes submit. Also, off-chain
solutions make restrictive assumptions about the interaction
between contracts, e.g., one smart contract does not internally
invoke functions of other smart contracts. Such interactions
are desirable and often occur in practice (see Appendix C).
An on-chain solution if designed carefully can be made to
automatically inherit the existing functionality of interaction
between smart contracts and also the security guarantees of
the underlying blockchain.
Our Approach. In this paper we propose TUXEDO, the first
on-chain solution that can theoretically scale τ/I close to 1
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while circumventing the problems discussed above. As a result,
TUXEDO can increase the useful computing power of PoW
blockchains significantly to allow transactions with non-trivial
execution time.
The core idea behind TUXEDO is to separate the consensus
on the ordering of transactions in the blockchain from their val-
idation. We achieve this by allowing miners to delay validation
of transactions in a block at height i (Bi) until the arrival of
block at height i + ζ (Bi+ζ) where ζ is a system parameter.
Hence we refer to this approach as Delayed Execution of
Transactions (DET). This way, the validation of transactions
in a block can be done in parallel with the PoW, thereby side-
stepping the competition between validation and PoW.
While the idea of DET may seem simple, securely adopting
it in PoW systems turns out to be non-trivial. The major
challenge arises due to the variability in the deadline (that is the
arrival of Bi+ζ) for validating transactions (of Bi). As block
generation is a random process (often modeled as Poisson),
there is the possibility (albeit rare) that an honest miner may
fail to execute transactions in Bi before receiving Bi+ζ . In
that case, the honest miner will not be able to validate Bi+ζ
immediately on its arrival. As a remedy, in TUXEDO honest
miners always extend the longest validated chain. Furthermore,
if a miner does not have the state (Si−ζ+1) for the next block,
it puts a special default state in place of the required state.
Unless otherwise stated, we refer to this default state as the
empty state. Using standard techniques from Queueing theory,
we prove (§VI-B) that these changes ensure that TUXEDO
achieves Chain growth, Chain quality and Safety similar to
known results for Longest chain PoW [16], [12], [17]. Also,
we prove in §VI-C that the fraction of blocks with empty state
mined by the honest miner can be reduced arbitrarily by setting
ζ appropriately.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We illustrate through analysis and experiments that a
naive increase of τ in legacy blockchains gives unfair
advantages to miners with faster processing power. An
adversary A can further exacerbate the unfairness by
skipping validation of received blocks and creating blocks
that it can process quickly.
• We design TUXEDO, a secure on-chain approach that can
theoretically scale τ/I to 1 in in PoW based permission-
less blockchains.
• We theoretically prove security guarantees of TUXEDO
under a synchronous network with end-to-end network
delay ∆ and fixed processing time τ .2 Our analysis
considers all possible strategies by a Byzantine adversary
controlling up to fmax < 0.5 fraction of the mining power.
We also present an approach to choose ζ in order to
achieve any desired fraction of honest blocks with non-
empty state.
• We implement TUXEDO on top of the Ethereum Geth
client and evaluate it in an Oracle cloud with 50 virtual
machines emulating top 50 Ethereum miners. Our eval-
uation demonstrates that TUXEDO does not suffer from
certain fairness problems while Ethereum does, for a high
value of τ/I.
2Pass et al. [16] use the term "asynchronous network" for a network with
the same constraints.
Paper Organization. In §II we present our system model
and assumptions. This is followed by a brief background of
block validation process of legacy blockchains and attacks on
them with high τ in §III. In §IV we introduce the concept
of Delaying Execution of Transactions and describe how
TUXEDO employs it to achieve high validation time. We
next describe our implementation methodology in §V. We
then present our theoretical analysis demonstrating security of
TUXEDO in §VI. §VII describes our prototype implementation
of TUXEDO experimental setup and observations from exper-
imental results. We describe the related work in §VIII and end
with a discussion in §IX.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a permissionless system consisting of a set
of miners. These miners form a connected network and run
a blockchain protocol with Proof-of-Work (PoW) as the un-
derlying consensus. All honest miners mine blocks on top of
the longest validated chain known to the miner (see §IV-B).
Block generation in TUXEDO is assumed to follow a Poisson
process with the rate λ where λ depends on the mining power
of the network and difficulty of the PoW puzzle. Each miner na
controls pa fraction of the mining power. Hence, any arbitrary
miner na will generate blocks at a rate λa = paλ. TUXEDO
allows execution of Turing Complete programs called Smart
Contracts. A smart contract can be created by sending a
transaction to deploy it on the blockchain. Once a contract
appears in the blockchain, its exposed functionality can be
invoked by other miners through transactions.
Smart contracts in TUXEDO have unique IDs, and they
maintain state, where state corresponds to the unique set of
key-value pairs stored at each miner and is controlled by the
program logic of the smart contract. For any arbitrary smart
contract cz , we use σz to denote the state of smart contract.
In addition to contracts, TUXEDO maintains Accounts, which
maintains tokens. Each account also has a globally unique ID
which is the public key of a public-private key pair generated
from a secure asymmetric signature scheme. Additionally,
TUXEDO has Clients where clients own accounts, can generate
transactions to create smart contracts, invoke their functions
and transfer tokens from one account to another.
Transactions in TUXEDO are ordered in a Transaction
Ordered List (TOL) and are included in a block. We use Ti to
denote the ith TOL. The contracts generated by transactions in
TOLs {T1, T2, . . . , Ti} are denoted as Ci = {cz|z = 1, 2, · · ·}
and the corresponding state as Si = {σz|z = 1, 2, · · ·}. Each
miner locally maintains states and updates it by executing a
given TOL. Formally, with initial state Si−1, the execution of
the TOL Ti is denoted by:
Si = Π(Si−1, Ti) (1)
where Π denotes the deterministic state transition function that
executes transactions in Ti in the order they appear.
Let Bl = {B0, B1, · · · , Bl} be the blocks known to na. In
addition to state, na maintains a transaction pool T(a)l , which
contains the set of valid transactions created by clients that
are yet to be included in a block till Bl. Hereon, when clear
from the context, we drop the superscript from T(a)l for ease
of notation.
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Assumptions. We assume the underlying network to be syn-
chronous with end-to-end delay of at most ∆, i.e., all messages
sent by an honest miner gets delivered to every other honest
miner within time ∆ from its release. Also, we assume that all
honest miners process blocks in any particular chain serially at
the rate of 1/τ , where τ is the maximum time needed to vali-
date a block. Like Ethereum, this can be enforced by requiring
each transaction to specify the maximum time needed for its
execution and keeping a cap τ on the total execution time
a block. Note that block processing is different from mining
a block; mining involves solving the PoW puzzle, whereas
processing is about executing the transactions inside a block.
Also, a block with high validation time neither implies a large
block size nor that the block has a large number of transactions
in it. A small block containing a few computationally-heavy
transactions can require a large validation time.
We also assume that the block processing at an honest
miner does not contend with PoW, and the honest miners
can simultaneously process blocks in distinct forks of the
blockchain tree. We envision that our system will be adopted
by blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum where block
processing can be done using CPUs while mining requires
ASICs. Furthermore, the number of simultaneous forks in them
are quite small [10].
We assume the presence of an adversary A, who can
control up to fmax < 1/2 fraction of total mining power of the
network and generate block at a rate β = fmaxλ. Adversarial
miners can be Byzantine and can deviate arbitrarily from the
specified protocol. The remaining miners are honest, control
the remaining (1 − fmax) the fraction of the mining power
generates blocks at a rate α = (1−fmax)λ, and strictly follow
the specified protocol. A can see every message sent by honest
parties immediately and can inject its messages at any point in
time. Also, A can delay messages sent by the honest parties
by a maximum of ∆ time.
III. BLOCK VALIDATION IN LEGACY BLOCKCHAINS
In this section, we first give some background on the block
validation process in Ethereum and later demonstrate why
increasing τ leads to reduced fairness in terms of the fraction of
blocks mined by an honest miner. This background assists us in
identifying the core problem behind smaller block validation
time in existing systems. In the later sections (§IV we will
describe how TUXEDO securely addresses these issues.
Ethereum is designed to force miners to validate blocks that
they receive. To understand why, we must note that Ethereum
state is not explicitly stored on the blockchain, only its digest
is. For a miner to create a potential block of its own which
includes a mining reward, it must put a digest of the new
state resulting from this block in the header. However, the
state resulting from executing the transactions of the previous
block act as an essential starting point to obtaining the correct
state to put in its own block. Hence the miner is forced to
execute transactions in the previous block received.
Once the miner successfully creates its own block, it start
mining i.e., solving PoW on this block. During this PoW two
things can happen: first, the miner receives a conflicting block
created by a different miner at the same height as its own
potential block; and second, the miner successfully solves the
PoW, broadcasts its own block with the valid PoW and proceed
to create the next block, extending its very own recent block.
Let us refer to the time spent validating the received block as
the Validation phase; the time spent in creation of next block
as the Creation phase, and time spent in PoW as the Mining
phase. As honest miners do not solve for PoW during the
validation and creation phase, we are interested in the time
these phases takes to complete. For this purpose, we will first
scrutinize these phases more carefully.
Case	I
Case	II
Figure 1: State transition at an Ethereum miner with i − 1 blocks
on arrival of the ith block. Dashed arrows represent next potential
block and solid arrow represents actual arrival of a block. In case I,
na receives Bi, a block mined by a different miner and in case II,
na mines the block B′i by itself.
If the longest chain known to an honest miner na has length
i−1, with Bi−1 at the tail of the chain as shown in Figure 1, na
tries to mine the next block B′i at height i. Let Si−1 be the state
after executing TOLs till Bi−1 and Ti−1 = {tx1, tx2, tx3, tx4}
be the latest transaction pool. For B′i, na first picks up a TOL
T ′i (e.g., T
′
i = {tx1, tx2}), executes its transactions in order
of their occurrence and starts PoW on block B′i. Let S
′
i =
Π(Si−1, T ′i ) be the updated state. Note that till na successfully
solves the PoW puzzle, the updated state is not committed and
remains cached at na. As described earlier, while running the
PoW algorithm for block B′i, one of two things can happen:
either na receives a valid block Bi at height i from the network
or na successfully solves the PoW. We now describe these as
Case I and II, respectively.
Case I. Let nb be the miner of the block Bi (containing ordered
list Ti) that na receives. Without any coordination between
na and nb, it is likely that Ti 6= T ′i . In that case, na first
validates Bi executing all the transactions in Ti. On successful
validation, na accepts the block and proceeds to create the
block Bi+1 at height i+ 1 by picking a new TOL Ti+1 from
Ti = Ti−1 \ Ti. Case I of Figure 1 illustrates this.
Case II. Unlike Case I, na commits the state update due to
execution of T ′i and proceeds to create the block B
′
i+1 at height
i + 1 after picking a new TOL T ′i+1 from Ti−1 \ T ′i . In our
example, T ′i+1 = {tx3, tx4}. na then executes the new TOL
T ′i+1 and starts PoW for B
′
i+1. Case II of Figure 1 illustrates
this.
Another way to describe the block validation and creation
mechanism is through the time intervals during which a
miner validates the received block, creates the next block and
performs PoW. Let t0 be the time instant of the arrival of the
block at height i and let τ be the validation and creation time
of a block. In case I, the miner validates the received block in
the time interval (t0, t0 + τ), creates the next block B′i+1 in
time interval (t0 + τ, t0 + 2τ) and only at time t + 2τ starts
PoW for B′i+1. However in case II, since na himself is the
creator of the block B′i, it skips validation of B
′
i and spends
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Figure 2: Actions taken by a miner on receiving a block Bi at time t0 to validate Bi and create the next block at height i+1 in Ethereum (top)
and DET with ζ = 2 (bottom). In DET,  denotes the time spent by the miner to validate the received block and create the next one. Since
validation/creation in DET involves only a small (constant) number of operations,  τ .
the time (t0, t0+τ) in creating block B′i+1, and starts PoW for
B′i+1 at time t0 +τ . The top half of Figure 2 demonstrates the
timings along with the computations a miner needs to perform
for Case I in more detail.
A. Consequences of high τ in legacy PoW Blockchains
Ideally when all miners are honest and with no network
delay, one would expect that the fraction of blocks mined by
a miner should be proportional to its mining power. In this
section, we demonstrate that is not the case, and show that
when τ/I is high, the fraction of block mined by honest miners
heavily depends on their relative transaction processing speed
in addition to their mining powers.
Observe from Case II that the creator of a block spends τ
units of extra time (i.e., between (t0 + τ, t0 + 2τ)) for PoW
while the remaining miners are busy creating the next block.
This extra time τ increases its chances of mining the next block
as well. This effect gets exacerbated if the miner controls a
large mining power (say 30%), because the miner will naturally
mine blocks frequently and each of these blocks gives it an
advantage to mine the next one as well.
More concretely, let λa and τa be the block mining rate and
block processing time of miner na, respectively. Let c = τa/τ
where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, i.e c is the ratio of block processing time of
na and remaining miners. c = 0 implies that na can process
a block instantly independent of τ . With these parameters, na
will spend only 2cτ units of time in case I before starting
PoW for the next block. Similarly, in case II, na will spend
only cτ units of time creating the next block before starting
PoW. Building on this intuition, we theoretically compute the
fraction of blocks na will mine in the longest chain for any
given choice of λa and c in Appendix B.
Figure 3 illustrates results from our theoretical analysis.
For example, with τ/I = 0.26, an honest miner who controls
30% of the mining power and can validate or create blocks
twice fast as others i.e. c = 0.50, will mine at least 46% of the
blocks. Further, a miner who skips both validation and creation
of blocks, i.e with effective c = 0 will mine at least 53% of
the blocks with 33% of the mining power. We also measure
the same using our experimental setup described in §VII and
observe that the network delay further allows A to mine 68%
of the blocks in the main chain.
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Figure 3: Fraction of blocks mined by miner na with 0.33 fraction
of the total mining power, i.e λa = λ/3 for varying c = τa/τ .
IV. DESIGN
In this section, we first introduce the concept of De-
layed Execution of Transactions (DET), the core component
of TUXEDO, that enables us to make τ/I ≈ 1. Next we
describe a mechanism to make DET robust against varying
block interarrival time and a Byzantine adversary. Finally we
describe the fee collection mechanism of TUXEDO.
A. Delayed Execution of Transactions
The basic idea behind DET is to decouple the inclusion of
transactions in the blockchain from the reporting (and hence
validation) of the state resulting from those transactions. In
TUXEDO transactions are ordered in a block without being
immediately validated, and the state resulting from them is
reported ζ blocks later. More formally, a block Bi at height
i contains TOL Ti and state Si−ζ = Π(Si−ζ−1, Ti−ζ). Hence
miners have a window of ζ blocks to pre-compute the state
required for validation and this pre-computation can be done
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Figure 4: Structure of blocks with Delayed execution of Transaction
with ζ blocks, where the state update corresponding of transaction
ordered list of a block Bi gets reported in the block Bi+ζ .
in parallel with the PoW. Figure 2 illustrates this for ζ = 2
where the resulting states are delayed by 2 blocks.
As explained in Case I in Section III, in existing blockchain
designs, up to 2τ time can “eat into” the PoW time. Thus,
in order to get τ/I ≈ 1, we need to delay the execution of
transactions by at least two blocks. In the rest of this section,
we first describe DET with ζ = 2 and then explain why an
even larger ζ is needed.
DET with ζ = 2. Let Bi−1 with state Si−3 and TOL Ti−1 (as
ζ = 2) be the latest valid block known to miner na (see
Figure 2). For now, assume that na has already computed (i)
S′i−2 = Π(Si−1, Ti−2) and (ii) S
′
i−1 = Π(Si−2, Ti−1) and
cached them prior to the arrival of the block Bi. Here S′i−2
and S′i−1 are the states locally computed by na for TOL Ti−2
and Ti−1 respectively before arrival of block Bi (ref. Figure 2).
Upon arrival of Bi, na validates it by checking whether the
reported Si−2 matches S′i−2 (step 1). If it does, then na accepts
Bi and starts computing Π(S′i−1, Ti) (step 3). Simultaneously,
na picks a new TOL T ′i+1 ∈ Ti−1 \Ti, creates the block B′i+1
by fetching the precomputed state S′i−1 from its cache (step
2), and starts PoW for block B′i+1 (step 4). This way, upon
arrival of a block, na is able to start PoW for the next block
immediately.
B. Handling variable block interarrival
If blocks arrive exactly I time apart from each other,
then ζ = 2 will be sufficient to scale τ/I ≈ 1. However,
in reality, block interarrival times are random and can even
be manipulated by the adversary to some extent. In case a
sequence of ζ blocks following Bi with TOL Ti arrive closely
spaced to each other, it is possible that a miner will not be
able to compute the state Si before receiving Bi+ζ . Hence, the
miner will not be able to immediately validate Bi+ζ . Without
any precautionary measure, in such a situation, miners will
be forced to defer creation of the next block, and hence the
PoW on it till it computes Si. If a large fraction of honest
miners temporarily stop mining, an adversary A with faster
block processing power will effectively enjoy higher fraction
of mining power and may even pull off the “51% attack”
during these periods. TUXEDO addresses this issue with two
critical observation: first, the probability of this event occurring
decreases with increasing ζ, and second, we can ask honest
miners to mine on the longest validated chain during such
scenarios. We elaborate on these below.
Need for higher ζ. To see why increasing ζ reduces the prob-
ability of the above mentioned undesirable event, we model
DET as a queuing system where the transaction processing
unit of a miner is analogous to the server. Each arriving block
is a task input to a queue and each block is processed in τ
units of time. In the absence of an adversary and network
delays, the block arrival follows a Poisson process with rate
α. Assuming the input rate is independent of the queue size,
this is essentially a M/D/1 queue. The sequence of blocks that a
miner is yet to process in a given chain represents the contents
of the queue.
If an arriving block enters a queue of size less than or equal
to ζ − 2 then its own state as well as that of the subsequent
block have been pre-computed. The probability of the queue
exceeding ζ − 2 is the probability of the miner missing the
deadline for computing the state which that block must contain.
This tail probability of the queue decreases with increasing ζ,
thus making larger ζ is more desirable. However, there is a
trade-off here, because a larger ζ implies that blocks update
the global state later, which is undesirable from a user’s point
of view. Hence ζ must be chosen to balance this tradeoff.
We leave detailed queuing models that take into consideration
input variation of blocks due to ∆, the presence of A, and the
trade-off due to larger ζ in §VI.
Remark. Due to forks, miners in TUXEDO maintain multiple
queues, one for each forked chain (see Figure 5), and pro-
cess them in parallel. Blocks which are common to multiple
chain (e.g. blocks {By, · · · , Bi} in Fig. 5 need to be processed
only once. All our analysis will be valid with multiple queues
because miner processes them in parallel and the input to each
queue is still upper bounded by the block generation rate of
miners.
time	
time	
Transaction	
Processing	
Unit
Processing
Rate
Queue	2
Queue	1
Figure 5: Queue(s) at a miner at time instant t0 and t > t0 where
the transaction processing unit at the miner process blocks in a queue
at a rate 1/τ . In case of a fork, as shown on the right part of the
Figure, i.e. B′i+1 and Bi+1 forking from Bi, miner maintains an
additional queue for the new fork. The dashed part of the Queue 2
i.e. blocks {By · · ·Bi} need not be processed explicitly and results
from processing these blocks from Queue 1 can be directly used. Here
a1 and a2 are arrival rates to Queue 1 and Queue 2 respectively.
Extending Longest Validated Chain. Although higher ζ low-
ers the probability of queue of an honest miner crossing ζ− 2
in the absence of adversary, additional care needs to be taken
to provably prevent a Byzantine adversary from sabotaging the
protocol. Thus we modify the chain selection rule of TUXEDO
from a standard longest chain selection procedure. We analyze
its security in §VI.
Honest miners in TUXEDO extend the longest chain they
can validate. If miners do not have the state to put in the
next block, it puts a protocol specified default state, such as
a sequence of zeros in place of the required state. Unless
otherwise stated, we refer to this default state as the empty
state. We refer to such blocks as ES blocks (i.e. blocks with an
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empty state). Similarly, we refer to blocks with the non-empty
state as non-ES blocks. ES blocks can contain transactions
(see §V) and non-ES block at height i report Si−ζ . Also,
during the entire duration, honest miners continue to process
all unprocessed blocks with correct PoW that appears in a
chain longer than the current mining head. On successful
validation, miner re-configures its mining head to pick the new
longest known validated chain.
C. Fees collection in TUXEDO
Recall that every transaction in TUXEDO specifies the
maximum amount of computation resources needed for its
execution. Based on this specification, fees of every transaction
in ith block, Bi is collected in the same block. These fees are
paid using the native token of TUXEDO, token1 (similar to
Ether in Ethereum). Once the transaction gets executed, any
leftover fees i.e., fees of unused computational resources are
refunded in Bi+ζ where the state after the execution of Bi’s
transactions is reported. 3 This ensures that only blocks that can
pay sufficient amount of gas, a unit of payment in Ethereum,
for their transaction fees enter the blockchain.
Similar to Ethereum, TUXEDO also allows its smart con-
tracts to transfer and receive tokens. However, since the trans-
actions of ith block, Ti, are executed after fees are collected
for ζ − 1 future blocks, additional care needs to be taken to
prevent fees of future blocks from altering execution results
of past transactions. Specifically, TUXEDO restricts its smart
contracts from using the native token. However, at the same
time, TUXEDO allows its contracts to create their own tokens
reminiscent of ERC’20 tokens in Ethereum and use them
during execution. These tokens could be contract-specific,
shared by several contracts, or shared by all contracts and is
up to the contract designer. In our implementation, every smart
contract uses the single ERC’20 token which we refer to as the
token2. We describe the details of our implementation in §V.
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Accounts and Tokens. Our implementation of TUXEDO has
two kinds of accounts: user accounts and contract accounts.
Each user account maintains both token1, the native currency,
and token2, the ERC’20 token to be used in contracts, whereas
contract accounts only maintains token2. contract accounts
maintain executables that can be invoked by transactions.
Transactions. Each transaction tx TUXEDO is a tuple contain-
ing {type, to, from, gas, ?} where type either takes the value
1 or 2, to (resp. from) is the receiver (resp. sender) address,
gas specifies the maximum amount of gas tx can use and ?
represents the auxiliary information required for execution of
tx. Transactions with type1 are addressed to user accounts
and transfers token1 from from address to to address. The
amount of token1 transfer is present in the auxiliary informa-
tion denoted using ?. Transactions of type2 are addressed to
contract accounts and ? contains the identity of the functions
to be invoked and the required function call parameters. For
every such transaction, miners in TUXEDO transfer an amount
of token1, as a transaction fee from its sender account to a
3We leave the exact refund policy as a design choice as we primarily focus
on the capability of refunding fees if needed. TUXEDO will work same for
schemes that does not refund fees as well.
Algorithm 1 TUXEDO for ζ ≥ 2
1: T : {txj |j = 1, 2, · · ·} . Transaction pool at the miner
2: C :
{
R′j ,S
′
j = Π(S
′
j−1, Tj)
}
. Contract Cache
3: P :
{
P′j = Π(P
′
j−1, Rj−ζ ,Φj)
}
. Payment Cache
4: Q : {Tj |j = 1, 2, · · ·} . TOL that are yet to be processed
5: PROCESSTOL(·) . Non-blocking call to process existing TOL
6: while true do
7: RECONFIGURE(Bk) . On arrival of new block
8: end while
9: procedure RECONFIGURE(Bk)
10: if VALIDATE(Bk) then
11: stop current PoW
12: B′k+1 ← CREATE(Bk)
13: start PoW on B′k+1
14: end if
15: end procedure
16: procedure VALIDATE(Bk)
17: valid← false; Sk−ζ ,Pk, Tk ← Bk
18: if Sk−ζ is empty then
19: P′k ← Π(P′k−1,Φk)
20: if P′k = Pk then
21: valid← true
22: end if
23: else
24: if S′k−ζ not in cache then
25: valid← false; add Tk to Q
26: else
27: P′k ← Π(P′k−1, R′k−ζ ,Φk)
28: if P′k = Pk and S′k−ζ = Sk−ζ then
29: add Pk to P; add Tk to Q; T← T \ Tk
30: valid← true
31: end if
32: end if
33: end if
34: return valid
35: end procedure
36: procedure CREATE(Bk)
37: T ′k+1 ← subset of T
38: if S′k+1−ζ in cache then
39: P′k+1 ← Π(P′k, R′k+1−ζ ,Φ′k+1)
40: return (S′k+1−ζ ,P′k+1, T ′k+1)
41: else
42: P′k+1 ← Π(P′k,Φ′k+1)
43: return (empty-string,P′k+1, T ′k+1)
44: end if
45: end procedure
46: procedure PROCESSTOL(·)
47: while true do
48: if Q is non empty then
49: Bj ← next block in Q
50: Tj ← TOL of Bj
51: Rj ,Sj = Π(Sj−1, Tj)
52: add Rj ,Sj to C
53: if j > current validated chain length then
54: Non-blocking RECONFIGURE(Bj)
55: end if
56: end if
57: end while
58: end procedure
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Figure 6: Steps performed at a miner to validate a block Bi from the network in TUXEDO with ζ = 2. After validation, miner creates the
next potential block B′i+1 and starts PoW. During PoW for block B
′
i+1, the miner computes the state required to instantly validate upcoming
blocks.
prespecified address denoted using Deposit. If in case tx.from
does not have enough token1, a miner discards tx.
Two States. In our implementation of TUXEDO every miner
maintains two different states: P and S where P is used to
store information related to the amount of token1 in each
user accounts and S is used to store the information regarding
contract execution and amount of token2 in all the accounts.
Since payment (including fees) and refund transactions only
modify P, such a segregation enables faster validation and
block creation.
Block Validation. Let Sj−ζ and Pj be the contract and
payment state at the end of block Bj . Also, Rj−ζ represents
the refund processed after the execution of Tj−ζ . Let the latest
block known to an honest miner na be Bi−1. Let Bi be the
next arriving block. Lets assume Bi is a non-ES block and na
has already computed and cached the following state before
its arrival.
P′i−1 = Π(P
′
i−2, Ri−ζ−1,Φi−1)
Ri−ζ ,S′i−ζ = Π(S
′
i−ζ−1, Ti−ζ)
Ri−ζ+1,S′i−ζ+1 = Π(S
′
i−ζ , Ti−ζ+1).
Note that applying Π on any TOL Tj also outputs the ordered
list of refund transactions corresponding to Tj . For ζ = 2, this
is depicted in Figure 6. On receiving the block Bi containing
TOL Ti and digests of state Pi and Si−ζ , na validates Bi as
follows: (i) na first computes P′i = Π(P
′
i−1, Ri−ζ ,Φi), (ii)
checks whether P′i matches with Pi, and (iii) na also checks
S′i−ζ matches Si−ζ .
Alternatively, if na hasn’t precomputed S′i−ζ and Bi is a
non-ES block, na continue to mine on the previous mining
head till it computes S′i−ζ and re-starts validating Bi as
above. However, if Bi is an ES-block and na has already
validated the latest non-ES ancestor of Bi, na computes P′i as
Π(P′i−1,Φi) to checks whether P
′
i matches with Pi and skips
step (iii) of validation. On successful validation, na accepts
Bi and proceeds to create the next block as described below.
Procedure VALIDATE in Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo code
for validation of blocks in TUXEDO.
Block Creation. On successful validation of the received
block, to create the next block na (i) picks a new TOL T ′i+1
from T \ Ti, (ii) computes P′i+1 = Π(P′i, Ri−ζ+1,Φ′i+1), (ii)
fetches S′i−ζ+1 from cache (if available), and (iii) creates the
next potential block B′i+1 containing T
′
i+1 and digests of P
′
i+1
and S′i−ζ+1. Also, the first non-ES block after a sequence of
ES-blocks applies all accumulated refunds since the last non-
ES block. Alternatively, if S′i−ζ+1 is not available in the cache,
na puts an empty string in place of S′i−ζ+1. After creating
B′i+1, na immediately starts PoW on B
′
i+1. Procedure CREATE
in Algorithm 1 presents the pseudo code for validation of
blocks in TUXEDO.
Execution of contract transactions In TUXEDO contract
transactions are executed in parallel to PoW as shown in
Figure 6. Specifically, during PoW for B′i+1, na computes
R′i−ζ ,S
′
i−ζ = Π(S
′
i−ζ−1, Ti−ζ). Also na adds Ti in the task
queue (ref. §IV-B) and executes Ti as soon as the execution
of all Tj for j < i, that appear prior to Ti, is done.
VI. ANALYSIS
We analyze security of TUXEDO in the presence of a
Byzantine adversary under all possible adversarial strategies.
A. Block Processing as a Queuing System
The arrival of blocks in PoW blockchain can be modeled as
a Poisson process with arrival rate λ with 1/λ as the expected
inter-arrival time between two consecutive blocks [14]. As all
honest miners takes τ units of time to process a block, the
processing rate of the server is 1/τ . On arrival of every new
block Bi with TOL Ti that extends a chain longer than the
current mining head at a miner na, na adds the block to its
queue. na processes (that is, validates) these blocks in First In
First Out (FIFO) order. As we have mentioned earlier, due
to forks, there will be multiple queues at each miner (see
Figure 5), but our analysis applies to any of them as arrival rate
at each queue is dominated by arrival rate in a single queue
setting and miner processes all queues in parallel.
Let Qa(t) denote the size of the queue of a miner na at
time t. If block Bk enters the queue at time tk, we use Qa(t−k )
and Qa(t+k ) to denote the size of queue immediately before
and after time tk respectively. Note, Qa(t+k ) = Qa(t
−
k ) + 1.
Handling non-ES blocks. The ability of a miner to validate a
received block and/or create an non-ES block is directly related
to the number of blocks in the queue of the miner na in which
Bk enters, i.e. Bk is at the tail of the corresponding queue.
Notice if Qa(t+k ) > ζ than the head of the queue contains TOL
Ti for i ≤ k−ζ, the miner will not be able immediately validate
validate Bk. Similarly, when Q(t+) = ζ, the miner will be able
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to validate Bk but will not have the state to immediately mine
a non-ES block on top of the received block.
B. Reduction of TUXEDO to Nakamoto PoW
We next illustrate that TUXEDO provides guarantees of
Chain growth, Chain Quality and Safety/Consistency similar
to known results of longest-chain PoW based Nakamoto sys-
tems [16], [12], [17].
Consider a time interval [s, s+T ]. Select the honest blocks
as shown in Figure 7. First skip ahead to s+ ∆, then find the
next honest block, then skip by ∆ and then repeat till time
s+T −∆. Let’s call these blocks B1, B2, · · · , BN . Let Bk be
generated at time tk.
 
1
 
2
 
  +  
  + Δ
 
1
 
2
+ Δ 
1 + Δ 
2
  +   − Δ
Figure 7: Honest blocks chosen in time interval [s+ ∆, s+ T −∆]
where the chosen blocks are separated by at least a gap of ∆.
Lemma 1. (Queue Difference) Let Bk be the mth block
starting from genesis block in the chain containing Bk. Call
these blocks b0, b1, b2, · · · , bm with b0 as the genesis block.
Let t′0, t
′
1, t
′
2, · · · , t′m be the time when an honest miner hears
the corresponding block for the first time. Then by tk + ∆ i.e.
t′m+∆, then all honest miners would have processed the state
required to validate Bk.
Proof: Let QL and QU be two hypothetical FIFO queues
with constant service rate 1/τ in which blocks b1, b2, · · · , bm
enter at t′1, t
′
2, · · · , t′m and t′1 + ∆, t′2 + ∆, · · · , t′m + ∆ respec-
tively. Let Q(k)a (t) be the position of the block Bk (i.e. bm) at
the queue of miner na at time t, and QBk(t) be its position at
the miner which created it. Then the following two conditions
hold:
Q
(k)
L (t) ≤ Q(k)a (t),∀t after Bk enters Qa (2)
Q(k)a (t) ≤ Q(k)U (t),∀t ≥ tk + ∆ (3)
Hence,
Q(k)a (tk + ∆) ≤ Q(k)U (tk + ∆) = Q(k)L (tk) ≤ Q(k)Bk (tk) (4)
Equation (4) implies that by time tk + ∆, the position of Bk
in the queue of all honest miners will be less than or equal to
the position of Bk in the queue its creator at time tk. Hence
if QBk(t
+
k ) ≤ ζ, i.e. Bk is a non-ES block, by time tk + ∆,
the position Bk will be lower than or equal to ζ at all honest
miners and hence, all honest miners will be able to validate
Bk by time tk + ∆.
Lemma 2. Let `(Bk) denote the length of the block starting
from genesis block b0 with `(b0) = 0. Then Bi for all i ∈ [1, N ]
which were mined between [s + ∆, s + T − ∆] as shown in
Figure 7 have distinct length. Further, `(Bi) > `(Bj),∀i > j.
Proof: Consider two consecutive blocks Bk, Bk+1 mined
at time tk, tk+1 respectively (need not be part of the same
chain). Let nk, nk+1 be the miners of Bk, Bk+1 respectively.
Since tk+1 > tk + ∆, nk+1 would have heard of Bk prior
mining Bk+1. Also, from Lemma 1 by time tk + ∆, nk+1
will have the state to validate Bk. Thus from time tk + ∆
onwards, nk+1 either will extend Bk or any other validated
block with same or greater length than Bk. This implies
`(Bk+1) > `(Bk). This is true for all pair of consecutive
blocks and hence by transitivity of length comparison, we get
`(Bi) > `(Bj),∀i > j.
Lemma 3. (Chain Increase) Let Lj(t) be the length of
the longest validated chain at miner nj at time t. Let
Lmin(t), Lmax(t) be the minimum and maximum of chain
lengths of all honest miners at any time t, i.e. Lmin(t) =
minj{Lj(t)} and Lmax(t) = maxj{Lj(t)}, then in the sce-
nario show in Figure 7, chain length of all honest miners grows
by at least N blocks, i.e Lmin(s+ T ) ≥ Lmax(s) +N .
Proof: From Lemma 2, `(Bi+1) ≥ `(Bi) + 1,∀ i ∈ [N −
1]. Let LBk(t
+
k ) be the length of the longest chain of miner
of block Bk at time t+k . Then from Lemma 2 we know,
LBk+1(t
+
k+1) ≥ LBk(t+k ) + 1 (5)
From Lemma 1,
Lmin(t
+
k + ∆) ≥ LBk(t+k ) (6)
Also, Lmin(s+ ∆) ≥ Lmax(s) as all blocks generated before
s reaches every honest miner by time s+ ∆. Hence,
Lmin(s+ T ) ≥ Lmin(tN + ∆)
≥ Lmin(s+ ∆) +N
≥ Lmax(s) +N (7)
Notice that the scenario shown in Figure 7 is stochastically
identical to the HYB experiment shown by Pass et al. in [16].
Hence the chain growth and chain quality of TUXEDO is
identical to results presented in [16]. Also, it is easy to see
that B1, B2, · · · , BN includes all loners defined in [17] (or
convergence opportunities defined in [16]) and hence the safety
results from [17] holds for TUXEDO. For completeness we
state the theorem here.
Theorem 1. (Safety (Thm. 8 in [17])) Let B∗ and B∗∗ be
two distinct blocks at the same height. If e−2α∆α > (1 + δ)β,
then once an honest node adopts a chain that buries B∗ by
k blocks deep, no honest node will adopt a chain that buries
B∗∗ by k blocks, except for e−Ω(δ
2k) probability.
Proof: Directly follows from Lemma 3 and proof of
Theorem 8 of [17].
C. Choice of ζ
As Q(t) ≥ ζ at a honest miner implies that the miner will
not be able to validate a received non-ES block, we compute
an upper bound on Pr[Q(t) ≥ ζ] under all possible adversarial
strategies after making certain approximations. Recall that
Q(t) ≥ ζ do not violate security of TUXEDO and hence the
guarantees provided in previous section still holds true.
A well-known result from queuing theory [15] is that in
any queuing system with constant service rate 1/τ , the size of
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the queue at any time t is given by:
Q(t) = sup
s
{
A(s)− s
τ
}
, (8)
where A(s) is the number of arrivals during the interval
[t−s, t]. In addition to the number of blocks generated during
the time interval [t−s, t], A(s) may also include honest blocks
from time interval [t − s − ∆, t − s] as these blocks might
be delayed due to network. Furthermore, an adversary can
deliberately withhold blocks mined prior to time t − s and
release them during [t−s, t]. However, as demonstrated in [16]
that to withhold a block by longer than time tw, adversary
needs to generate a private chain longer than honest chain
during that time.
Approximating the growth rate of the honest miners as a
Poisson process with rate γ where γ = α/(1 + ∆α), we can
approximate the race between honest chain and the adversarial
chain for time tw as a Skellam Distribution [18] with µ1 = βtw
and µ2 = γtw. Specifically, let N(tw), XA(tw) be the random
variables denoting the chain growth of honest miner and
number of blocks generated by A during a time interval of size
tw respectively. Then the success probability of A withholding
a block for longer than tw is Pr[XA(tw)−N(tw) > 0]. Since,
XA(tw) and N(tw) are independent Poisson random variable,
XA(tw)−N(tw) follows a Skellam distribution with mean µ1
and µ2 as mentioned above.
Using results from Skellam distribution, given a small
threshold η, we pick a value of t∗ such that
Pr[XA(t∗)− Y (t∗)] ≤ η (9)
and assume that A is not allowed to withhold a block for
more than t∗ units of time. Under this assumption, we next
upper bound the probability that queue of an honest miner will
exceed any given ζ under all possible adversarial strategies.
Theorem 2. For any given 0, 1, t∗, let s0 = max{∆0 , t
∗
1
}
and λ¯ = (1 + 0)α + (1 + 1)β. Let Q(t) be the size of an
honest miner’s queue at time t. Then
Pr[Q(t) ≥ ζ] ≤
∞∑
i=ζ
pii + 1−
ζ−1∑
i=0
λ¯ie−λ¯s0
i!
, (10)
where pii is the stationary distribution of M/D/1 queue with
arrival rate λ¯.
Proof: Let XH(b), XA(b) be the random variable de-
noting the number of blocks mined by honest miners and
adversary in a given time interval of length b respectively.
As we assume that A withholds a block for at most t∗ time
before the honest miner accepts them, blocks in A(s) are either
mined by the adversary during (t − s − t∗, t) or mined by
honest nodes during (t − s − ∆, t). For any 0 > 0, 1 > 0,
let s0 = max{∆0 , t
∗
1
}. Then ∀ s ≥ s0, s+ ∆ < (1 + 0)s and
s+ t∗ < (1 + 1)s. Hence,
A(s) ≤ XH(s+ ∆) +XA(s+ t∗) (11)
≤ XH((1 + 0)s) +XA((1 + 1)s),∀ s ≥ s0 (12)
Let X(s) be a random variable denoting the number of
blocks generated by a Poisson process within a time interval
of size s with arrival rate λ¯ = (1 + 0)α + (1 + 1)β. Since
independent Poisson random variables are additive, we have
the equality in distribution,
X(s)
d
= XH((1 + 0)s) +XA((1 + 1)s) (13)
Hence using equation 8, we have is
Pr[Q(t) > b] (14)
≤ Pr
[⋃
s>0
{
A(s)− s
τ
> b
}]
(From equation 8)
= Pr
[ ⋃
s>s0
{
A(s)− s
τ
> b
}]
+ Pr
 ⋃
s≤s0
{
A(s)− s
τ
> b
}
≤ Pr
[ ⋃
s>s0
{
X(s)− s
τ
> b
}]
+ Pr[A(s0) > b] (15)
≤ Pr
[⋃
s>0
{
X(s)− s
τ
> b
}]
+ Pr[A(s0) > b] (16)
The first term of equation 16 is the standard M/D/1 tail queue
probability with arrival rate λ¯, processing rate 1/τ and hence
its tail distribution probability decreases with increasing ζ. For
any given b, t∗, , and ∆,
Pr[A(s0) > b] ≤ 1−
b−1∑
i=0
λ¯ie−λ¯s0
i!
. (17)
Using our worst-cast analysis, we suggest concrete values
of ζ one should consider to bound the probability of an
honest miner’s queue exceeding ζ. As we expect attacks to
be intermittent (if any), we also numerically compute these
bounds for an honest execution of the protocol, i.e., in a
network without any adversary. Figure 8 and 9 plots the result
of Theorem 2 under some example parameters.
Concrete choice of ζ. For any given λ, fmax,∆, and τ ,
we evaluate ζ such that Pr[Q(t) ≥ ζ] < 0.01. For all our
evaluation we have used η = 0.001 in equation 9. Figure 8
illustrates our results for different values of τ/I and I/∆. For
each τ/I and I/∆, we pick s0 that minimizes ζ. For example,
with 25% adversary and allowable processing time equal to
half of average interarrival time, i.e. τ/I = 0.5, we get ζ = 39
for I/∆ = 10.
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Figure 8: Required ζ to upper bound Pr[Q(t) ≥ ζ] with 0.01. Dashed
lines correspond to fmax = 0.25 and solid lines are for fmax = 0.33.
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Queue overflow in honest execution. For any given ζ, λ,∆,
and τ we compute the bounds using equation 16 by putting
β = 0 and t∗ = 0. This corresponds to a execution of TUXEDO
in the absence of an adversary. Figure 9 illustrates the upper
bound on the fraction of time queue at a honest miner will have
more than ζ blocks for different values of ζ. All plots are for
τ/I = 0.5. Note that in the absence of A, for I/∆ = 10, with
ζ as low as 20 queue, less than one in a billion honest blocks
will hit a queue larger than ζ.
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[Q
(t
)
≥
ζ
]
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Figure 9: Upper bound on the probability of queue at a honest miner
crossing the threshold in the absence of an adversary for τ/I = 0.5
VII. EVALUATION
To evaluate computation scalability of TUXEDO we built
a prototype of on top of Ethereum Geth client version 1.9.3.
Our implementation consists of all parts of TUXEDO including
an on-demand adversarial behavior to skip validation of trans-
actions. In many experiments we compare the performance of
TUXEDO with that of Ethereum. To facilitate such compar-
isons, we implement an adversary who skips validation and/or
creation of blocks in Ethereum.
A. Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup consists of 50 virtual machines
(VMs) running in Oracle Cloud. All expect one of the VMs are
dual-core machines with 8GM of RAM running Ubuntu.16.04.
The remaining VM which we use as an adversarial node has 8
core CPU @2.19 GHz, 30GB of RAM. We deliberately assign
one node a computational advantage over others to measure
its effects on the fairness of Ethereum and TUXEDO. In our
setup, all nodes have identical network bandwidth of 1GB/s
download and 100MB/s upload speeds.
Node. Each VM in our experimental setup runs one TUXEDO
node. The mining power of each node is set according to the
distribution of top 50 Ethereum miners extracted from [2]. This
corresponds to 99.98% of Ethereum’s total mining power. For
each node in our setup, we simulate its block mining process
by drawing the interarrival time between the blocks from an
exponential distribution with parameter λ/h where h is the
fraction of mining power controlled by the node. In Table I
reports the percentage of mining power controlled by top 14
miners that sum up to 97% of the total mining power.
Network. To make a prototype of this Ethereum mining
network, we collected data regarding the geographical location
of the top 50 miners in Ethereum. Each node in our experiment
emulates the geographical location of one such miner. We then
32.98 16.16 15.06 5.72 5.67 4.41 4.14
3.53 2.61 1.84 1.34 1.32 1.25 1.05
Table I: Percentage of mining power controlled by top 14 miners in
descending order our experimental setup. For e.g. first miner controls
32.98% of the mining power and 14th miner controls 1.05% of the
mining power.
form a randomly connected network of these nodes where
the degree distribution follows a power law with exponent
−2.5. Communication delays between every pair of nodes in
the network are set accordingly to the ping delays observed
between respective geographical locations [1]. We use Linux
tc command to simulate the link delays.
Methodology. We test TUXEDO by deploying 50 contracts
each implementing Quicksort, 2D matrix multiplication, and
iteration with basic arithmetic operations. We then invoke func-
tions from each contract with appropriate parameters to achieve
the desired block processing time. Throughout our experiment,
we ensure that each block contains ~165 transactions in total.
As we simulate an adversary (A) that skips validation of blocks
and creates new ones with contracts whose execution results
are already known to the A, we deliberately restrict all of the
above mentioned contracts to be stateless. Note that, as the
primary metric of evaluating TUXEDO is processing time of a
block, any choice of contracts will give us the same results as
long as they achieve the desired block processing time.
B. Experiments and Results
We first evaluate the effect of increasing τ/I in Ethereum
with all miners being honest. We then repeat the experiment
in the presence of an adversary A, who skips validation of
received blocks and creates blocks with transactions for which
A already knows the execution results. We then perform the
same set of experiments with TUXEDO and compare our
results with Ethereum. Next for fixed τ/I = 0.70 we evaluate
TUXEDO with increasing network delay.
In all experiments the first miner (n1) controls ~33% of the
network’s mining power and can process ~1.67 times faster
than other miners. Further, in all experiments we keep block
mining difficulty such that 1/λ = 15.0. Hence I is equal
2τ + 1/λ for Ethereum experiments and 1/λ for TUXEDO
experiments.
Fairness violations in Ethereum. Figure 10a illustrates the
fraction of Ethereum blocks miner n1 mines. Observe that with
increasing τ/I, the fraction of blocks n1 mines increases even
when n1 is honest corroborating our theoretical analysis (ref.
Appendix B). When n1 is adversarial, i.e. n1 skips both
validation and creation of blocks, n1 mines significantly higher
fraction of blocks. These fractions are higher than theoretically
computed fraction in Figure 10a. This is due to the fact that
unlike our simplistic assumption in theoretical analysis (ref.B),
in the experiments n1 mines for the entire duration of the
experiment.
High fork rate in Ethereum. With high τ/I in Ethereum,
we observe that the the fork rate of Ethereum increases. Let
Mining Power Utilization (MPU) of a blockchain network be
defined as — the fraction of blocks mined by the miners that
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Figure 10: Fraction of blocks mined by the miner n1 controlling 33% mining power and c = 0.6 in Ethereum and TUXEDO
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0.011 0.122 0.205
50
100
τ/I
M
in
in
g
Po
w
er
U
til
.
n1,Hst n1,Adv
n2,Hst n2,Adv
(a) Ethereum, d = 1
0.011 0.122 0.205
2
4
6
8
τ/I
Pr
op
ag
at
io
n
de
la
y Honest
Adversarial
(b) Ethereum, Median block prop. delay
Figure 12: (a) Mining power utilization of first two miner (n1 and n2) (b) Measured
median propagation delay of blocks with increasing τ/I in Ethereum.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Queue length
Fr
ac
tio
n
of
bl
oc
ks τ/I = 0.379, hst.
τ/I = 0.379, adv.
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(excluding n1) for τ/I = 0.379 and d = 1
end up in the eventual longest chain. A blockchain with lower
MPU implies that a lower fraction of mined blocks end up
being in the blockchain and that many blocks are orphaned.
Figure 11a illustrates the MPU of Ethereum network with
increasing τ/I. Notice that despite having λ = 1/15 and
I = 2τ+1/λ, the fork rate increases. This is because miners in
Ethereum only forward a block when they have fully validated
its parent block. Thus with high τ/I, miners in Ethereum
more frequently encounter blocks whose parents are yet to
be validated by the miners. As a result, with τ/I, the effective
propagation delay of blocks in the network increase which
leads to higher forks and lowers the MPU of the network.
Figure 12b illustrates that the median propagation delay
of Ethereum network. Median block propagation delay in
the presence of a adversarial node is lower due to fact that
the adversarial node can forward blocks immediately as it
processes all received blocks immediately. Also we observe
that higher τ/I does not lower MPU of the adversarial node
n1 by much. Further, MPU of a adversarial node is much
higher than its honest counterpart. Figure 12a illustrates the
mining power utilization of top 2 miner in our experimental
setup (ref. I). This is because when n1 is adversarial, it
mines solo for longer duration. This allows n1 to mine longer
sequence of blocks more frequently while other miners were
busy extending an older block. Hence, when network gets
synchronized again, that is honest nodes have to backlog of
blocks to process, the string of blocks mined by the n1 enters
the blockchain with high probability.
Increasing τ/I in TUXEDO. We demonstrate that higher τ/I
does not affect miners in TUXEDO by repeating the above
experiments in TUXEDO. Figure 10b illustrates that the fraction
of blocks n1 mines does not vary in TUXEDO despite high
τ/I and an adversarial n1. Also, unlike Ethereum high τ/I
does not affect the mining power utilization of TUXEDO since
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all miners can immediately validate all received blocks. This
is illustrated in Figure 11b. We use ζ based on our analysis
in §VI-C for t∗ = 0 and Pr[Q(t) ≥ ζ] ≤ 2−15.
Figure 13 demonstrates the queue observed by a arriving
block in an honest miner for τ/I = 0.379. Observe that
presence of a skipping adversary does alter the queue size
honest miners observe. Further, more than 99% of the blocks
find a queue size of four or less and less than < 0.1% blocks
finds a queue size of eight or higher. This implies that though
ζ is chosen to be high, for majority of the blocks the users
of TUXEDO will get the execution results of their transactions
within four blocks.
Increasing network delay. For fixed τ/I = 0.74 we evaluate
TUXEDO with increasing delay. Specifically we increase link
delay between each pair of connected node by a factor of
d = 1, 2, 4. Figure 10c illustrates that higher delay does not
affect the fraction of blocks mined by n1 for both honest and
adversarial n1. We also observe that the MPU of TUXEDO does
not decrease in TUXEDO despite higher network delay (see
Figure 11c). This is because, the top five miners controlling
approximately 75% of mining power in our experimental
network are in close proximity with each other. Hence the
increased delay does not affect the block propagation delay
between them.
VIII. RELATED WORK
To best of our knowledge, our work is the first on-chain
solution to increase τ/I in permissionless blockchains.
There have been attempts to enable the execution of com-
putationally intensive smart contracts [11], [9], [20], [7], [6]
through off-chain solutions where they delegate the execution
of intensive transactions to a subset of miners or volunteer
nodes. These solutions make additional security assumptions
beyond those required for PoW consensus. Arbitrum [11]
requires nodes participating in the protocol to be rational and
one participating node to be honest. Yoda [7] requires an
unbiased source of randomness whereas current mechanisms of
generating distributed randomness are highly expensive [19].
Ekiden [6] relies on SGX Enclaves and requires all enclaves to
be trusted, an assumption that is made questionable by recent
attacks [21], [5]. In Zokrates [9] participants are required to
generate expensive non-interactive proofs for verification of
off-chain computations. As we have mentioned in Section I,
off-chain solutions make restrictive assumptions about depen-
dencies between contracts.
In an alternative approach, a recent line of work has tried
to increase the scalability of smart contracts by concurrently
executing transactions [8], [3], [22]. Dickerson et al. [8]
enable the miner to concurrently execute the transaction using
a pessimistic abstract lock and inverse-log represented as a
directed acyclic graph (happen-before graph). This inverse-
log is later used in the validation phase, to replay the block
creators parallelization schedule. Anjana et al. [3] replaced
the pessimistic lock with Optimistic Concurrency Control
favoring low-conflict workloads but at the cost of high abort
rate for transactions with more conflicts. Zhang et al. [22]
improves concurrency of the validation phase by recording
the write set of each transaction in the block, which incurs
additional storage and communication overhead. These works
are optimistic in the sense that the adversary can always create
blocks whose validation cannot be parallelized. Hence, they
cannot be used to scale τ/I.
IX. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have presented TUXEDO which theoretically allows
validation time of blocks in PoW based blockchains to be
comparable to the average interarrival time, i.e. τ/I ≈ 1.
Such a high validation time allows TUXEDO to scale exe-
cution to smart contracts on-chain. Such scalability lowers
contract execution fees by allowing more computation per
block. Hence, it makes blockchains accessible to applications
with heavy computation. Since all miners in the blockchain
execute all smart contracts, TUXEDO allows arbitrary inter-
action between contracts, which is not possible with existing
off-chain solutions for scalability. Another advantage of the on-
chain approach is that all miners update state locally and hence
obviate the need transferring state updated due to transaction
execution. Hence the bandwidth usage of TUXEDO is identical
to existing system such as Ethereum.
We prove the security of TUXEDO in synchronous network
with end-to-end delay of ∆ in the presence of a Byzantine
adversary considering all possible adversarial strategies. We
defer security of contract execution to the higher level where
mechanisms like discarding state modifications due to execu-
tion of invalid transactions can be easily adopted atop core
TUXEDO. We also present a principled approach to pick ζ for
any given choice of parameters.
Although, state corresponding to a contract transactions
gets reported ζ block later, our analysis and evaluation demon-
strate that, most (> 99%) blocks in TUXEDO finds a queue size
of less than five on its arrival. Hence in practice, miners will
have execution results of transactions reasonably quickly. Fur-
thermore, token1 transactions are executed immediately thus
can be used in the low latency applications. Our experimental
results demonstrate working of TUXEDO for τ/I = 0.70 for
an implementation over a standard Ethereum geth client.
A major advantage of TUXEDO is its simple design and
minimal additional security assumptions over underlying PoW
consensus. TUXEDO’s core idea of delaying execution of trans-
actions by up to ζ blocks can be applied to other consensus
protocols such as Algorand, proof-of-stake, and BFT protocols.
Determining the gains it provides with these protocols is a
potential future research direction.
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APPENDIX A
BLOCK PROCESSING TIME IN ETHEREUM
We measure τ , the time required to execute all transac-
tions in Ethereum blockchain for the first 7.5 Million blocks
using Ethereum Geth Client. Our measurement using a virtual
machine with 16 cores, 120GB memory, 6.4TB NVMe SSD,
and 8.2 Gbps network bandwidth shows that τ is only about
1% of the average interarrival time. Figure 14 illustrates our
measurement for all the blocks.
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Figure 14: Time taken to validate a received block Ethereum by
re-executing the contained transactions. Transaction execution time
refers to the time taken to execute only the transactions of a received
block while block processing time includes both transaction execution
time and time taken to write the updated state to the disk.
APPENDIX B
HIGH τ IN LEGACY POW BLOCKCHAINS
Recall from §III, on arrival of new block, a miner first
validates the received block for τ units of time and then creates
the next block for another τ units of time. Only after 2τ time
units the miner starts PoW for the next block. Whereas when
a miner mines the block himself it only spends τ creating
the next block before starting PoW. Note that in case a miner
receives the next block while validating the previous one, the
time for which the miner needs to wait before it could start
PoW is higher than 2τ . The exact waiting time depends on the
exact time of arrival. We make a simplification and assume that
all miners (including adversary A) releases blocks only after
τ units of time has passed from the broadcast of the previous
block. We also assume that the network is fully synchronous.
Let Λ = {λj |j = 1, 2, . . . , |N |} be the block arrival rates
due to a miner nj during the periods they are performing PoW.
Let τ1and τ where τ1 = cτ for 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 denote the time
required to validate a full block by miner n1 and other miners
nj for j > 1 respectively. Note that c < 1 implies that n1
can validate (and also create) blocks faster than others. For
example, c = 1/2 implies n1 takes half the time than others
take to validate or create blocks. Let U = {1, 2, · · · , |N |} be
the states of the MC where state u represents that the miner
of the latest block is nu. State transition happens on arrival
of every block and pu,v denote the transition probability for
the transition from state u to state v. Note that on every state
transition to state v, nu mines a single block.
All honest miners. Since all miners in Ethereum do not always
start PoW simultaneously, transition probabilities in the MC
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must consider only active miners. For example, for c > 1/2,
in state 1, no miner performs PoW for the first cτ time units.
Between time (cτ, 2τ ] only n1 does PoW while other miners
were busy validating and creating blocks. On the contrary, at
any other state v, nv starts PoW at time τ , n1 starts at 2cτ
and the remaining start at time 2τ . This is depicted in the
top diagram of Figure 15. Similarly, the bottom diagram in
the same Figure illustrates the miners that perform PoW for
at different intervals starting from different state. In this paper
we only derive transaction probabilities of the MC for c > 1/2
as one can easily derive for c ≤ 1/2 using similar approach.
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Figure 15: Miners who are active during each time interval from the
instant when last block gets generated in a situation where all miners
are honest.
Lemma 4. Let X,Y be two independent random variable with
exponential distribution with arrival rate λx, λy respectively.
Then the probability of the event A = (X ≤ τ ∧X ≤ Y ) is
denoted using N(λx, λy, τ) and is equal to:
Pr[A] = N(λx, λy, τ)
=
λx
λx + λy
(
1− e−(λx+λy)τ
)
(18)
Proof: For any arbitrary time t where 0 < t ≤ τ , Pr[t −
dt ≤ X ≤ t] = fX(t)dt = λxe−λxtdt and Pr[Y > t] =
1−λye−λyt. Thus to get the closed form expression for Pr[A],
we compute,
Pr[A] =
∫ τ
0
fX(t)Pr[Y > t]dt
=
∫ τ
0
λxe
−λxte−λytdt (19)
Solving the above produces the desired result.
Theorem 3. For a particular c > 1/2, τ and Λ = {λj |j =
1, 2, . . . , |N |}, with every miner honestly following the proto-
col, the state transition probabilities are given as:
p1,1 = 1−M0(λ1, 2τ − cτ) + p1M0(λ1, 2τ − cτ) (20)
pu,1 = M0(λu, 2cτ − τ) [N(λ1, λu, 2τ − cτ)
+M0(λ1 + λu, 2τ − cτ)p1] (21)
p1,v = pvM0(λ1, 2τ − cτ) (22)
pu,u = 1−M0(λ1, 2cτ − τ)
+M0(λ1, 2cτ − τ) [N(λu, λ1, 2τ − cτ)
+M0(λ1 + λu, 2τ − cτ)pu] (23)
pu,v = M0(λ1, 2cτ − τ)M0(λ1 + λu, 2τ − 2cτ)pv (24)
with N(λu, λv, t) is as given in Lemma 4 and M0(λx, t) is the
probability of 0 arrival in a Poisson process in a time interval
t with arrival rate λx. Hence M0(λx, τ) = e−λxτ .
Proof: Transition of state 1 to 1 can happen either if n1
mines the next block during 2τ − cτ interval or if n1 mines
the block after time 2τ . The former happens with a probability
1−M0(λ1, 2τ − cτ). The latter happens with a probability p1
conditioned on that the former event did not happen. Hence
the probability of the latter is p1M0(λ1, 2τ − cτ). Also since
these two events are mutually exclusive, p1,1 is sum of the
probability of the events. Similarly, starting with state 1, any
other miner nv will mine the next block only if n1 does not
mine the block during an interval of length 2τ − cτ starting
at cτ . Also since all miners will be mining after time 2τ if
no block was mined before that, the probability that the next
winner would be nv is pv . Hence the transition probability
p1,v equal to pvM0(λ1, 2τ − cτ).
Alternatively, starting from a state u with u 6= 1, nu
will mine the next block during time interval (τ, 2cτ ] with
probability 1−M0(λu, 2cτ − τ). Otherwise nu can mine the
block during (2cτ, 2τ ] . But as both n1 and nu will be mining
during (2cτ, 2τ ], the probability of nu mining the block before
n1 is equal to N(λu, λ1, 2τ−2cτ). Lastly if nu mine the block
in neither of these interval, nu will mine the next block with
probability pu = λu/λ. Combining the above will give the
transition probability pu,u. The transition probability pu,1 can
be derived similarly.
Lastly, state transition from a state u to v with u 6= v 6= 1
can happen if neither n1 nor nu mines a block prior time 2τ .
Hence the transition probability pu,v is equal to M0(λ1, 2cτ −
τ)M0(λ1 + λu, 2τ − 2cτ)pv
Using the above state transition probabilities and mining
power from Table I we numerically compute the stationary
probabilities of the Markov chain with all miners being honest.
Figure 3 illustrates our results for different c with varying τ .
Higher τ in the presence of an Adversary. Let node n1 with
arrival rate λ1 be controlled by an adversary A. We consider
two different behaviors of the adversarial node n1. First, n1
validates the received blocks as per the protocol but instantly
creates a block by putting transactions whose execution results
are already known to n1. In second n1 skips validation of the
received block as well and instantly starts PoW on top a new
full block. The former attack is very practical as any miner
can do that without any additional computational resources.
The later damages fairness more severely but requires n1 to
produce final state due to transactions in the received block
without executing them. An adversary can launch the later
attack if it can download the modified state due to previous
block from the creator of of the previous block. Figure 16
illustrates which miners do PoW at different time intervals
starting from the instant of successful PoW on the previous
block. The diagram at the top is when n1 skips only creation
and in the diagram at the bottom is when n1 skips both
validation and creation. Here, we will only derive the transition
probabilities for the latter, and the transition probabilities for
the former can be derived similarly.
Theorem 4. Given τ and Λ = {λj |j = 1, 2, . . . , |N |}, with
λ1 as arrival rate of the adversarial node n1, the transition
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Figure 16: Miners who are active during each time interval from
the instant when last block gets generated. The diagram in the top
corresponds to a adversarial node n1, who only skips creation of
blocks and the diagram at the bottom is in when n1 skips both
validation of received block and creation of new ones.
probabilities for the Markov chain when n1 skips validation
of received blocks and the creation of new ones are:
p1,1 = 1−M0(λ1, 2τ) + p1M0(λ1, 2τ) (25)
p1,v = pvM0(λ1, 2τ) (26)
pu,1 = 1−M0(λ1, τ) +M0(λ1, τ)[N(λ1, λu, τ)
+M0(λ1 + λu, τ)p1] (27)
pu,u = M0(λ1, τ)[N(λu, λ1, τ) +M0(λ1 + λu, τ)pu] (28)
pu,v = M0(λ1, τ)M0(λ1 + λu, τ)pv (29)
Proof: When n1 mines the last block, all other nodes will
start PoW for the next block only after 2τ time units whereas
n1 will do PoW for the entire 2τ interval. Hence transition
from state 1 to 1 will happen if either n1 mines the block in
the first 2τ time interval or n1 mine the after 2τ time units.
The former happens with a probability 1−M0(λ1, 2τ) and the
later can happen with probability p1 conditioned on the former
not happening. Hence p1,1 is 1−M0(λ1, 2τ) +p1M0(λ1, 2τ).
Similarly, the transition from state 1 to another state can only
happen if n1 did not mine during the first 2τ time units. Also
since all nodes will mining after 2τ time units the transition
probability p1,v is equal to pvM0(λ1, 2τ).
When a node nu, u 6= 1 mines the last block, n1 instantly
starts PoW for the next block. Hence for the first τ units of
time only n1 will be mining as even nu will be busy creating
the next block. During time (τ, 2τ ] both n1 and nu be mining
and after 2τ the rest of the miners will start PoW for the next
block. Thus n1 can mine the next block either during the first
τ or in the interval (τ, 2τ ] or after 2τ . The first can happen
with a probability 1−M0(λ1, 2τ), the second with probability
N(λ1, λa, τ) conditioned on that the first did not occur, and
lastly n1 will mine a block after time 2τ with probability p1
in case no block was mined prior to 2τ . Combining the above
will give us the transition probability pu,1.
Similarly transition from state u to itself happens when nu
mines the next block either during time interval (τ, 2τ ] or after
time 2τ . The former happens with probability N(λu, λ1, τ)
conditioned on the event that n1 did not mine the next block
during first τ time units and the later with probability pu
conditioned on neither nu nor n1 mining a block before 2τ .
Finally, transition to state to a state v, v 6= u 6= 1, will
only happen with if neither nu nor n1 mine the next block
before 2τ . Hence the transition probability pu,v is equal to
M0(λ1, τ)M0(λ1 + λu, τ)pv .
Figure 17 illustrates numerically computed fraction of
blocks mined by node n1 which can validate blocks faster (by
factor 1/c) and skips creation of blocks. Note that c = 0.0
in the figure corresponds to the case where n1 skips both
validation of received blocks and creation of next ones.
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Figure 17: Fraction of blocks mined by a adversary who validates a
received block in time τ1 = cτ units of time, instantly creates block
by putting transactions whose execution results are already known to
the adversary, and controls approximately 0.33 fraction of the mining
power.
Closed-form probabilities. In a system with n miners, one
needs to solve a system of n linear equations to get closed-
form equations for the stationary probabilities. We do not solve
these as a part of this paper. But we compute closed-form
stationary distribution for a particular case is given below.
Let there be K nodes in the network with an equal mining
power of each node. Among these K nodes an adversary A
controls a f fraction of the node and all adversarial nodes skips
both validation and creation of blocks.
Consider an honest node which has just mined a block
and just finished creating a new block. We assume that K is
large enough to ensure that the probability of this honest miner
successfully mining in the next τ units is approximately zero.
In other words, we assume that the probability of all honest
nodes together mining in this interval is zero and so only A
mines in this interval. Under this assumption the Markov chain
discussed so far can be reduced to a MC with only two states
as depicted in Figure 18.
1 2
Figure 18: Reduced Markov chain to analyze Skipping adversary. A
general Markov chain for the skipping adversary can be reduced to
the Markov chain above for large n where each adversary controls a
f fraction of compute power and honest mining power is distributed
among the remaining n − 1 honest power such that the maximum
amount of compute power a single miner controls extremely small.
State 1 (resp. state 2) represents that the last state was
mined by a adversarial (resp. honest) node. The transition
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probabilities are given as:
p0,0 = p1,0 = 1−M0(fλ, 2τ) + fM0(fλ, 2τ) (30)
p0,1 = p1,1 = (1− f)M0(fλ, 2τ) (31)
Let Pr be the transition probability matrix of this Markov
chain and let Ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) be the stationary probabilities of
the states 1, 2 respectively. Then we solve, ΨPr = Ψ to get
the stationary probabilities and these values are:
ψ1 = 1−M0(fλ, 2τ) + fM0(fλ, 2τ), (32)
ψ2 = 1− ψ1 (33)
APPENDIX C
INTERACTION BETWEEN CONTRACTS
We measure the interaction between contracts for 50k
blocks starting at a height of 6.5 Million. To measure this
information, we sync an Ethereum Geth Client in archive
mode. Such a node stores the debug_trace of all transactions
starting from the genesis block. We loop through debug traces
of each transaction in every block in the given range and
use EVM CALL, DELEGATECALL, and STATICCALL opcode to
determine whether the transaction invoke a function which
internally calls functions from other transactions. Figure 19
illustrates our findings. Specifically, we observe that in this
corresponding range, in each block more than 50% of the
transactions are addressed to a smart contract. Also, among
all the transactions approximately 20% of the transactions
internally invokes function calls to other contracts.
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Figure 19: Fraction of contract transactions in a block and the fraction
of contract transactions which invokes at least one function from a
different contract for 50 thousands blocks starting with block height
6.5 Million.
APPENDIX D
IMMEDIATE VALIDATION TIME.
In TUXEDO a contract transaction requires a fixed amount
of time for initial validation (to execute its payments etc.), irre-
spective of its total execution time. Thus immediate validation
of blocks will be faster in TUXEDO with ζ ≥ 2 compared to
a legacy PoW system equivalent to ζ = 0, such as Ethereum,
where the full contract must be executed immediately. To
quantitatively demonstrate this, we recalculate the gas usage
of all Ethereum blocks starting from 5 Million block height to
5.3 Million if they were executed in TUXEDO. Specifically, for
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Figure 20: Gas usage in TUXEDO for Ethereum blocks in the range
5M to 5.3M
each block, we go through each transaction and consider a gas
usage of 21000 if the transaction is a payment transfer and gas
usage of 42000 (21000 for fee transfer and 21000 for refund)
if the transaction was addressed to a contract. We consider
the sum of all the gas usage computed as per above as the
gas usage of TUXEDO. Figure 20 compares our findings with
actual Ethereum gas usage. Notice that gas usage in TUXEDO
is almost half that of Ethereum gas usage.
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